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This paper describes the results of work begun many years ago by
Edward S. Howle and me and carriedforward intermittently since then
byme. Howle andIestimatedthevalueofthe UnitedStatesfixed capital
stock (current and 1860 prices) atdecade intervals, 1840-1900, and cir-
culated in mimeographed form a manuscript describing our estimating
procedures (Gallman and Howle, n.d.). This manuscriptwas neverpub-
lished, although it served as the basis for a number ofdescriptive and
analytical papers by us and by others (Gallman and Howle 1971; Davis
and Gallman 1973, 1978; Davis etal. 1973, chap. 2; Gallman 1965, 1972).
While Howle and I thought the estimates werefundamentally sound, we
regarded the project as incomplete and chose to delay publication until
we were more fully satisfied with it. We wanted to run additional tests;
in particular, Howle thought that appropriate samples from the manu-
script census (Soltow's [1975] work ultimately met our requirements)
would give us the means for strong tests ofa setofimportant estimating
decisions. A numberofminor sectoral estimates had beenhastily made,
and we believed that they could be improved with more research and a
little ingenuity. We also wanted to extend the series to earlieryears, add
figures for elements ofthe capital stock ignored in our original manu-
script, and work out regional distributions ofthe totals.
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Our decision to delay was a mistake. Both ofus were drawn offinto
other work, I temporarily, Howle permanently. The manuscript entered
the underground of research; it was occasionally cited and our data
were used, but it was never subjected to the constructive criticism that
publication would have brought. We should have remembered that all
research is, in a sense, preliminary, and that to withhold work for long
serves scholarship badly, however good the motives for withholding
may be.
The delay has not been all a waste. In the years since we wrote the
original manuscript I have managed to do most of the things we had
planned: I have carried out additional tests, thoroughly revised the old
estimates (here and there substituting new series), added estimates of
important elements ofthe capital stock that were not treated in the old
manuscript, and extended the series to earlier years. I. This does not
mean, of course, that the work is now complete-sound and durable
in every respect. It is certainly not. Gaps remain (for example, there
are no figures for the value of roadways), and there are any number
of ways in which the existing estimates could be improved. But ad-
ditions and improvements must be left, for the time being, perhaps to
be carried out eventually by other hands. The existing estimates seem
to me ready for formal presentation to the scholarly community, at
long last.
Part, but not all, of the formal presentation will take place in this
paper. There is not space enough here to include estimating details:
the notes describing our procedures now run in excess of 200 manu-
script pages, more than the Conference would happily publish. In the
present paper I will be able to deal only with the types of estimating
procedures and tests adopted and their general results, the identity and
character of the principal sources used, and the theoretical concepts
that guided the work. These subjects are treated in section 4.2. Section
4.3 is concerned with the theoretical and quantitative relationships
between the new estimates and those already in the field: the Goldsmith
and Kuznets series, as well as the original Gallman and Howle figures
(Kuznets 1946; Goldsmith 1952; Gallman and Howle, n.d.; Gallman
1965). Section4.4 considers the ways in which the new series illuminate
the nature of the nineteenth-century United States economy and the
course of United States economic development.
The new series contain estimates of the value of land (except agri-
cultural land in 1840). I will use the term "national wealth" to refer to
the value ofreproducible capital, land, stocks ofmonetary metals, and
net claims on foreigners. "Domestic wealth" will mean the value of
reproducible capital and land. Notice that paper claims are excluded
from both ofthese aggregates, as are consumers' durables and human
capital. The terms "national capital" and "domestic capital" refer to167 The United States Capital Stock in the Nineteenth Century
national wealth and domestic wealth, respectively, minus the value of
land. The concepts I refer to as "wealth" and "capital" are sometimes
called (by others) "capital" and "reproducible capital," respectively.
4.2 Concepts, Sources, and Methods
4.2.1 Uses ofCapital Stock Estimates
There are at least four scholarly uses for aggregate capital stock
series.
1. They can be used in place ofnationalproductseries-orin addition
to national product series-todescribe the scale, structure, and growth
ofthe economy. There is no reason why, over short or even interme-
diate periods, the capital stock should grow at exactly the pace ofthe
national product, but over the long run there should be a considerable
degree ofsimilarity. Forthis reason capital stock series have sometimes
been used as proxies for national product series in the measurement
of long-term growth (Jones 1980). But one could easily make a case
for the use ofsuch series as independent indexes ofgrowth, not simply
as proxies for national product. Looked at (and measured) in one way,
the capital stock ofa given year describes the accumulated savings of
the past; looked at (and measured) in a different way, it is a vision of
future production (see below). Either way, we have a picture of the
economy that is different from the one provided by the national prod-
uct, and one that is analytically useful.
2. Capital stock series have appeared as arguments in consumption
functions and, thereby, in the analysis ofthe level ofeconomic activity,
cyclical variations, and economic growth. Land and consumers' du-
rabIes are helpful additions to capital in these uses, as are paperclaims.
3. The capital stock is a consequence of savings and investment
decisions, with which are tied up choices oftechnique. The level and
structure ofthe capital stock emerge out ofthese decisions, and capital
stock series are used in studying them.
4. Finally, capital stock series are used in the analysis ofproduction
relationships and the sources ofeconomic growth, a practice that has
been at the heart ofone ofthe major theoretical disputes ofthe postwar
period.
In this paper the capital stock series are put chiefly to the first use
and, to a limited extent, to the third and fourth.
4.2.2 Methods of Estimating the Capital Stock
Capital stock estimates may be made in two ways: they may be
cumulated from annual investment flow data (Raymond Goldsmith's
perpetual inventory method [Goldsmith 1956]) or they may be assem-168 Robert E. Gallman
bled from censuses ofthe capital stock. Ifcensus and annual flow data
were perfectly accurate, if the identical concepts were embodied in
each, and if appropriate estimating procedures were used, then per-
petual inventory and census procedures would yield the same results.
In fact, they rarely do, although given the rich opportunities for dis-
crepancies to arise, it is surprisinghow narrowthe margins ofdifference
often are.
The choicebetweenthe two techniques turns onthe types and quality
of data available. From 1850 through 1900 there were six reasonably
comprehensive federal censuses ofwealth, while for 1805 and 1840 we
have census-style estimates constructed by able and informed contem-
poraries-Samuel Blodget (1806) and Ezra Seaman (1852)--chiefly from
federal data. Investment flow data, from which perpetual inventory
estimates might be made, are less generally available. But there are
some that offer opportunities for estimates superior to those derivable
from nineteenth-century census-style data. The best were assembled
in the extraordinarily well conceived and careful work ofAlbert Fish-
low (1965, 1966) on the railroads. We used Fishlow's estimates as the
bases for our railroad series and similarly exploited the work ofCran-
mer (1960), Segal (1961), North (1960), Simon (1960), and Ulmer (1960)
on canals, the international sector, telephones, and electric light and
power. We also built up our own perpetual inventory figures for the
telegraph industry and for consumers' durables. No doubt other sec-
toral estimates could be constructed, with profit, from flow data, al-
though I doubt that the remaining opportunities are quantitatively im-
portant. The estimates described in this paper are chiefly (and by
necessity) drawn from census-style data (see table 4.1).
There are also some aggregate flow datawhich, while not very helpful
in the derivationofsectoral estimates, proved useful in the construction
ofaggregate perpetual inventory estimates ofmanufactured producers'
durables and structures-estimates that we have used for checking the
census-style figures and for constructing annual capital stock series.
That story is told elsewhere; I will also make brief reference to it
subsequently in this paper (see Davis and Gallman 1973; Gallman 1983;
Gallman 1985).
4.2.3 Valuation ofCapital
In principle, capital stocks might be valued in any number of\\Tays.3
In practice, there are only three ways ofany importance, two ofwhich
exist in two variants. (I refer here to current price estimates; constant
price estimates are discussed below.) Capital may be valued at acqui-
sition cost (which I will also refer to as "book value"), at reproduction
cost, and at market value.4
Acquisition cost corresponds to the notion (expressed above) ofthe














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.171 The United States Capital Stock in the Nineteenth Century
estimates is that the capital stock ofeach year is valued in the prices
of many years, so that no meaningful comparisons (at least none that
comes to my mind) can be made. This difficulty can be overcome by
adjusting the databy means ofa general price index-aconsumer price
index would be best-sothat all elements ofthe capital stock ofa given
year are expressed in the prices ofthat year. A capital stock so valued
retains the sense ofacquisition cost: the valuation expresses the capital
stock in terms offorgone consumption. The forgone consumption con-
sists of the consumption goods given up in the year of investment,
expressed in the prices ofthe year to which the capital stock estimate
refers. Unambiguous comparisons can thus be drawn-with the na-
tional product ofthe same year, for example.
The capital stock may also be valued at reproduction cost. Each item
is valued at the cost ofthe resources that would be required to replicate
it in the year to which the capital stock estimate refers, given the factor
prices and techniques ofproduction ofthat year. The capital stock thus
has the sense ofcongealed productive resources, valued consistently,
so that a summation has a precise meaning. Such estimates are well
adapted to the study ofproduction relationships. They avoid, in some
measure, the circularity problem implicit in market value estimates.
Compared to acquisition cost estimates, they express the capital stock
in terms ofcurrent productive resources rather than historical forgone
consumption.5
The third system values the capital stock in market prices; that is,
eachitem ofcapital is appraised atthe price it would bring in the current
market. The market value ofa piece ofcapital is presumably a function
ofits productivity, its expected life, and the going rate ofinterest. The
capital stock, so valued, expresses the income that capital is expected
to earn, discounted back to the year to which the estimate refers. Such
a measure would be useful in consumption function applications, as
well as in describing the scale and structure of the economy.
Book and reproduction cost measures differ, theoretically, in that
the former measures the capital stock in terms of what was given up
to obtain it, while the latter measures the capital stock in terms ofwhat
would have to be given up in the current year to reproduce it. In an
unchanging economy in equilibrium, these measures would be identi-
cal. In an economy in which there were no changes except in the price
level, they could be made identical by means ofthe deflation adjustment
described above. In the absence ofthis adjustment, book value would
exceed reproduction cost wheneverthe price level was falling, and vice
versa. Changes in relative prices could lead to the divergence of the
two measures, even afteradjustment. Thus ifthe prices ofcapitalgoods
fell relative to the prices of consumption goods, adjusted book value
measures would exceed reproduction cost, and vice versa. (All ofthe172 Robert E. GaRman
above analysis rests on the assumption that the market price of new
capital goods equals the reproduction cost of these goods. If that is
not the case, matters become more complicated, as will appear.) In
fact, we know that the price indexes ofneitherconsumption norcapital
goods exhibited a very pronounced trend over the last four decades of
the antebellum period, although the latterfell slightly as compared with
the former (see Brady 1964; Historical Statistics 1960, sere El, 7, 8).
Between 1859 and 1869-78, the former rose dramatically, while the
latter did not (Gallman 1966). The two then fell pronouncedly until
nearly the end of the century, the latter declining the more markedly.
Thus, for the dates ofconcern to this paper, book value (adjusted and
unadjusted) probably exceeded reproduction cost modestly, 1840-60,
and more markedly, 1880-1900; adjusted book value also probably
exceeded reproduction cost in 1870.
Book value measures look to the past-What was given up to obtain
capital-while market values look to the future-earnings potential. In
an unchanging economy in equilibrium, and with perfect knowledge,
book value and market value would differ only in that the former treats
each piece ofcapital as though it were new, while the latter does not.
Even in an unchanging economy, fixed capital would gradually wear
out. Therefore old fixed capital would sell for less than new fixed
capital, and a capital stockexpressedin marketvalues wouldbe smaller
than one expressed in book values. The disparity could easily be re-
moved by deducting capital consumption from the book value mea-
sures, producing estimates of net book value.
The effects of changing prices (levels and relative prices) on the
relative magnitudes of net book and market values are presumably
much the same as the effects of changing prices on the relative mag-
nitudes of book and reproduction cost values (see above). Once we
drop the assumption of perfect knowledge, other opportunities for di-
vergences betweencapital stockestimates basedonthese two concepts
emerge. Specifically, deviations between the expected life ofindividual
pieces offixed capital (on which capital consumption allowances rest)
and theiractuallife may arise. These deviations may prove, in practice,
not to be serious, in view of the opportunity for errors of opposite
direction to offset in the aggregate, although a general change in the
rate ofinnovation could produce an uncompensated deviation.6 Changes
in the interest rate produce systematic shifts in the relative values of
assets ofdiffering life expectation, in the market, but do not influence
aggregate net book values. Actual changes in the interest rate over the
last60 yearsofthe nineteenth centuryseemlikely to have raised market
values above net book values from 1870 onward, but not by much,
except perhaps for the year 1900 (Gallman 1983, 1985).
Once allowance is made for capital consumption, reproduction cost
(that is, net reproduction cost) ought to be similar to market value.173 The United States Capital Stock in the Nineteenth Century
Indeed, ifthe economy were in equilibrium-suchthat the market price
ofnew capital equaled its reproduction cost7-and if capital consump-
tion allowances followed the pattern implicit in the structure of the
sales prices ofcapital goods ofdiffering vintage, then market value and
net reproduction cost would be identical. In fact, however, these con-
ditions are not met. Market prices deviate from the value ofresources
used up in production (there are profits or losses), and capital con-
sumption allowances fail to reflect precisely the structure of prices of
capital of differing age. Thus divergences arise between market value
and net reproduction cost, divergences ofa type discussed previously
in connection with book and market values.
Finally, it should be said that the deviations among net book value,
net reproduction cost, and market value are least marked for items
recently produced; in equilibrium, there is no deviation at all for new
goods. The faster a capital stock grows, ceteris paribus, the lower the
average age of capital and the narrower the differences among book
value, reproduction cost, and market value. As will appear, the United
States capital stock grew at an extraordinarily rapid pace in the nine-
teenth century. Thus the application of the three concepts might pro-
duce net valuations that differed little from one concept to the next.
The market value and reproduction cost of inventories also will nor-
mally differ little. Thus the more important inventories are in the total
capital stock, the smaller the disparity between aggregate reproduction
cost and aggregate market value, ceteris paribus. Inventories were, in
fact, an important element of the nineteenth-century capital stock,
partly because agriculture bulked large in the economy and agriculture
held large inventories (e.g., ofanimals).
Ifdata were readily available and estimates costlessly made, it would
be desirable to have sets ofcapital stock estimates based on acquisition
costs, reproduction costs, and market values. Comparisons among the
estimates would have interesting analytical uses (e.g., Tobin's q). Un-
fortunately, these conditions do notobtain. Dataare less than abundant
and less than perfect; the assembly ofestimates is not costless.
In recent times the data that have been most abundant have been
acquisition cost data, since firms maintain records of sales and pur-
chases and keep books on their capital stock. Given good price data,
evidence on purchases and sales can also be converted into perpetual
inventory reproduction cost estimates, although the procedure is not
problem-free. Market values and census-type figures on reproduction
cost are very much harder to obtain. Few elements ofthe capital stock
(apart from goods held in inventory) are sold in any given year. Ifthe
capital stock is to be valued at market prices, imputations must be
drawn from recorded prices in markets that may be very thin.8 Esti-
mating reproduction cost is even more difficult, since it sometimes
requires that one work out the cost, in a given year, of producing a174 Robert E. Gallman
good which, in fact, was not produced in that year. These are familiar
points. But we should not lose sight ofthe fact that market and repro-
duction costs are constantly being estimated, and that there are experts
who spend their lives at these tasks--experts hired by insurance com-
panies, the loan departments ofbanks, and various tax offices. Indeed,
most of us here today who own homes have a fair idea of what they
would bring on the market, orhow much it would take to rebuild them,
despite the recent gyrations of the real estate market.
In the nineteenth century, book value data were much less common
than they are today. Until late in the century, most firms charged off
capital purchases on current account. Thus there were few books to
referto when the census takercamearound. Perhapsequally important,
businessmen did not think in terms ofbook value. It was much more
natural for them to appraise plant and equipment in terms of what it
would take to replace it should it all burn down, or what it might sell
for. This was even more clearly the case for farmers and householders
viewing their property. These notions ofvalue seem to have influenced
the designers ofcensus questions. While the questions are by no means
always crystal clear, they seem to refer most often to market value or
net reproduction cost. (The two concepts are not always clearly dis-
tinguished.) There is little doubt--especially for the first three or four
census dates-thatbook value was only rarely sought by census takers.
How rarely is a matter on which there is not full agreement. Howle
and I decided that most ofthe census returns we used were expressed
in market values or net reproduction costs (see table 4.1). But I grant
that we sometimes stand in opposition to very good authority. For
example, Kuznets (1946) and Creamer et al. (1960) believe that the
manufacturing censuses, 1880-1900, returned book value. Howle and
I disae;ree.
I do not have the space here to argue Howle's and my case with
respect to this matter, although I will do so on another occasion. As
my previous remarks have suggested, the distinctions among book
value, market value, and reproduction costmay not have greatpractical
significance, in any case, so far as the nineteenth-century capital stock
is concerned,9 especially in view of the wide margins for error that
must be assigned to the estimates. What is more important is the ques-
tion of whether the census measurements of fixed capital are net or
gross. Here we have access to a test that does not rely on the inter-
pretationofnineteenth-century language. We cancheckthe census data
(land improvements and manufactured producers' durables, separately)
against perpetual inventory estimates based on reproduction cost. The
story ofthese tests has been told elsewhere (Davis and Gallman 1973;
Gallman 1983, 1985), so I offer only a brief summary here: The net
reproduction cost estimates check quite closely with the census ag-175 The United States Capital Stock in the Nineteenth Century
gregates before the Civil War, suggesting that the latter are, indeed,
net valuations. There is also some supportfor the notion thatthe census
valuations refer to reproduction cost and that they are accurate. The
postwar fit is poorer, but the evidence for the belief that the census
figures are net is strong: the perpetualinventoryfigures typicallyexceed
the census figures.
Our estimates ofagricultural land improvements (clearing, breaking,
fencing, draining, irrigating) depend chiefly on census physical stock
data (e.g., acres ofimproved land) and various coefficients developed
from the work of Martin Primack (1962). Given the form of the data,
we were restricted to the construction of reproduction cost figures.
Fishlow's (1965, 1966) estimates of railroad investment also rest on
physical data, as do our estimates for the telegraph industry. In these
cases, however, the form of the data left open the possibility of con-
structing book value series. In orderto maintain consistency with most
of the rest of the work-and because we believed they would prove
more useful-wechose to produce reproduction costestimates instead.
The capital stock figures, thus, consist chiefly of net reproduction
cost or market value estimates, as table 4.1 indicates. The assignment
ofitems to the reproduction cost category in that table is sure, but the
same cannot be said of the estimates referred to as "market value."
For a number of these, the valuation may, in fact, refer to net repro-
duction cost. The practical distinctions between these two types of
measures on the dates to which the capital stock estimates refer, how-
ever, are unlikely to be very important, for reasons previously given.
All ofthe data-including the federal census data-underwent con-
siderable processing and testing during the construction of the esti-
mates. The estimating and testing notes are much too extensive to be
included here. Some general statements ofappraisal can be ventured,
however.
The evidence is considerably weaker for 1840 and 1870 than for the
other census dates. The 1840 census provided much less information
on wealth than did the censuses in subsequent years (although with
respect to the trade sector it was unusually helpful). Also, prices fell
dramatically across that census year, which means that it is very im-
portant to date the available evidence correctly. We cannot be abso-
lutely sure that we have done so. The census dragged on for an inor-
dinate length of time, so that the dating of census magnitudes is
problematical. We also were obliged to depend heavily on the work of
Ezra Seaman (1852), who was not always entirely clear about his val-
uation base. The 1870 census came at a difficult time, and it is widely
believed that Southern wealth was badly returned (Ransom and Sutch
1975). Nonetheless, it must be said that the results of the perpetual
inventory tests for these two dates do not impugn the stock estimates.176 Robert E. Gallman
Ofcourse the test is particularly difficult to run for 1840 and 1870, and
the results must be regarded as particularly chancy. Still, it is moder-
ately reassuring that the stock and flow estimates are about as con-
sistent at these dates as at any others in our series}O
The test for 1880 is less successful. It suggests that our stock esti-
mates at that date-for both equipment and improvements-may be
too low. These are matters to which I will return below. It is perhaps
sufficient to say here that the capital stockfigures are much more likely
to tell an accurate story ofthe long-term rate ofgrowth and structural
changes ofthe capital stock than ofthe decade-to-decade changes, and
this is particularly true after 1860.
4.2.4 Constant Price Series
The best capital stock deflators available are to be found among the
price index numbers assembled by Dorothy Brady (1966) to deflate
components of the GNP. The Brady indexes are the best for several
reasons: they are true price index numbers ofcapital goods (including
structures); they are available in considerable detail; they were con-
structed with careful regard to their theoretical meaning; and their
theoretical meaning makes them reasonably apt deflators for capital
stock series valued in terms ofreproduction cost or market value (see
also Brady 1964). They are not perfect, but, in the absence of price
datafor old capital, they are as close to perfection as can be had. They
are linked price indexes describing, in principle, the movement ofthe
prices ofcapital goods ofunchanging quality. If the economy were in
equilibrium in all the relevant years, such that market prices and re-
production costs ofnew goods were identical, and ifthe prices ofnew
and old goods moved closely together over time (i.e., the interest rate
was the same at each relevant date and the rate of obsolescence was
unchanging), then deflation ofcapital stock estimates valued in market
prices or net reproduction costs would yield a constant price series
expressed in net reproduction costs. That is, it would produce a series
in which eachelement measured the net reproduction costofthe capital
stock, given the factor prices and techniques ofproducing capitalgoods
of the base year. Of course these conditions were surely not met: I
have already pointed out that the interest rate changed, affecting the
relative magnitudes of market value and reproduction cost. Nonethe-
less, the constant price capital stock series approximates more nearly
to a reproduction cost series than it does to any othercoherentconcept.
I will treat it as such, therefore, throughout the rest of this paper.
While the Brady indexes were the chief deflators we used, other
price data figure in important ways in the construction ofthe constant
price capital stock series. Some important components of the capital
stock were built up by placing values on counts of capital goods, de-177 The United States Capital Stock in the Nineteenth Century
scribed in physical terms. In these cases-improvementsto agricultural
land (structures apart), railroads, the telegraph, farm animal invento-
ries, crop inventories-constantprice estimates could be made directly
from the evidence on physical counts and base year prices, and we
could be sure that the series so constructed were true reproduction
cost series, or very close thereto. Inventories of manufactured goods
and imports were deflated with price indexes germane to the types of
products incorporated in these inventories, drawn from sources other
than the Brady papers (Gallman 1960; Historical Statistics 1960, sere
U-34, E-l, E-70).
The Brady indexes refer to the census years (beginning on June 1of
the years ending in 9and ending on May 31 ofthe years ending in zero)
before the Civil War, and to calendar years ending in 9 after the Civil
War. The current year capital stock valuations to which the Brady
indexes apply referto June 1ofthe years ending in zero. Iwas therefore
obliged to adjust the Brady indexes, on the basis of other available
price data, to make them conform to the appropriate dates. Gaps in
the coverage ofthe Brady indexes were filled similarly.
4.3 Old and New Capital Stock Series Compared
There are both conceptual and substantive differences between the
old Gallman-Howle capital stock estimates and the new ones reported
on in this paper. The conceptual differences are the more important.
When Howle and I estimated the value of property employed in
agriculture we decided to extract from the value of agricultural land
(and to list separately) the value ofagricultural structures, but to treat
all other agricultural improvements as part of the value of land. We
wanted to be able to link our series with series extending into the
twentieth century, and we believed that this treatment of agricultural
land and improvements would bringourworkintoconceptualalignment
with the twentieth-century estimates.II When I came back to this work
I decided that a second set ofestimates should be made, in which all
land improvements are treated as capital, as ofcourse they are. These
estimates would gQ to make up a capital stock series roughly corre-
sponding, conceptually, ..with the GNPII series ofmy paper in Volume
30 of Studies in Income and Wealth (Gallman 1966). For purposes of
analyzing nineteenth'"~entury developments, the GNPII series is cer-
tainly more appropriate than the GNPI series; similarly, the broader
capital stock series would be superior for these purposes to the nar-
rower one.
I made estimates of the reproduc~ion cost of clearing and breaking
farmland, fencing it, and draining and irrigating it, all ofthese estimates
based on the work of Martin Primack (1962), as I have previously178 Robert E. Gallman
indicated. The value offences was taken net of capital consumption.
Retirements were deducted from the otheritems, but no allowance was
made for capital consumption, on the ground that normal maintenance
would prevent physical deterioration of these improvements. Clearly
some deduction in value should have been made to account for the
deterioration ofimprovements on land withdrawn from production but
not yet returned, for census purposes, as unimproved (i.e., retired),
but I could devise no system for making this type ofadjustment. The
improvements estimates are therefore almost certainly overstated, as
compared with the values recorded for other elements of the capital
stock. How important this matter may be, I do not know, although I
doubt that it is ofgreat importance.
Farm improvements (exclusive ofstructures) constituted a very large
part ofthe capital stock, but a part that declined in relative importance
as time passed. Thus roughly six-tenths ofthe agricultural capital stock
consisted ofthese improvements in the years 1840 and 1850, a fraction
that fell to less than half, in current prices, in 1900, and something over
one-half, in constant prices. The fraction oftotal domestic capital ac-
counted for by these improvements fell from between three-and-a-half
and four-tenths, in 1840, to just over one-tenth in 1900 (see table 4.2).
It should be clear, then, that the new Gallman-Howle capital stock
series, inclusive of improvements, is substantially larger than the old
one, and exhibits a substantiallylowerrate ofgrowth. Theseare matters
to which I will return below. .
. As I have already indicated, I also made a number of substantive
changes to the old Gallman and Howle series. So far as the current
price series are concerned, the chief changes are as follows: I substi-
Table 4.2 Ratios oftbe Value ofFarm Improvements (Exclusive of
Structures) to tbe Value of United States Farm Capital and tbe
Value of United States Domestic Capital, Current and Constant
Prices, 1840-1900
Ratio of Value of Improvements to Value of
Farm Domestic Farm Domestic
Year Capital Capital Capital Capital
(Current Prices) (1860 Prices)
1840 .58 .34 .61 .38
1850 .59 .30 .61 .34
.1860 .56 .27 .56 .27
1870 .51 .22 .55 .24
1880 .51 .18 .58 .22
1890 .48 .14 .55 .14
1900 .49 .13 .54 .12
Sources: See text.
Note: The denominators include farm improvements.179 The United States Capital Stock in the Nineteenth Century
tuted Weiss's estimates ofgovernment buildings for the very prelimi-
nary estimates Howle and I originally used (Weiss 1967); I changed the
original animal inventory estimates, making them more comprehensive
(Howle and I had originally included only mature animals); I altered
the estimates ofnonagricultural residences and trade capital for 1870,
the adjustments resting on evidence unavailable to Howle and me when
we built up ouroriginal series; Iimproved the price indexesfor shipping
and railroad capital, which affected only the current price series, since
the constant price series were estimated directly from data on physical
capital. On balance, these changes are small so far as the years 1840,
1850, 1860, and 1880 are concerned: in these years the new and 0ld12
national wealth series are within 1V2% ofeach other, once allowances
are made for differences in coverage between the two series. 13 In the
remaining 3 years, the margins are much wider: about 8V2% in 1870
and about 4% in 1890 and 1900, the new estimates being below the old
in each year. For 1890 and 1900, the principal explanation lies in the
changes I have made in the price indexes used to convert the constant
price railroad improvements series intocurrentprice. Originally, Howle
and I had used Ulmer's (1960) index, despite Fishlow's (1965, 1966)
warning that the price series incorporated therein and the weights at-
tached to them made the index inadequate for our purposes. I have
now replaced this index with a new one, in which I have considerably
greater confidence. 14
The new railroad improvements price index and the new price index
for vessels in the merchant marine and fishing fleets also affected the
1870 estimates, making the new ones lower than the old ones. Much
more important, however, is the fact that I have now reworked the
1870 estimates ofnonfarm residences and ofthe capital ofthe "trade"
sector (the "otherindustrial" sector, in Kuznets's [1946] terminology).
The new estimates were adopted as the resultoftests basedonevidence
supplied by Lee Soltow (1975), evidence that was not available to
Howle and me when we constructed our original series. The new es-
timating procedures are very much stronger than the old ones were,
and a test for internal consistency provides strong support for the
results. Nonetheless one cannot be sure that the new estimates are
actually closer to the truth than were the old ones. Both sets depend
upon data from a census that underenumerated the population and
probably undercounted property as well (Ransom and Sutch 1975).
Since the new estimates are lower than the old ones, it may very well
be that they reflect the true value of the relevant property less accu-
rately than do the old estimates, despite the fact that they rest on
technically superior procedures.
Some, but not all, ofthe changes in the currentprice series, described
above, affect the constant price series as well. I also made a few small
alterations in those constant price series that were built up from counts180 Robert E. Gallman
ofphysical capital (e.g., the railroads). More important is the fact that
I made some adjustments to the price index numbers. Howle and I
received many of the price indexes we used in correspondence with
Dorothy Brady. In a few cases, Brady subsequently revised herfigures.
Howle and I also used the Brady indexes withoutadjustment, although,
in fact, they did not refer to precisely the dates we required (see the
discussion of this point above). When I returned to the estimates, I
corrected the price indexes, so that they reflected Brady's last word
on the subject and so that the indexes were more nearly relevant to
the dates to which the censuses refer. The principal changes, substan-
tively, were to raise the 1840 estimates of agricultural buildings and
nonfarm residences, and to lowerthe estimates ofmachinery and equip-
ment in manufacturing, 1890 and 1900, and the "trade" sector, 1870-
1900. Ofthese alterations, the ones referring to 1840 are most doubtful.
In these cases I was obliged to build up new priceindexes for structures
to replace an index number abandoned by Brady. It may 'very well be
that my new indexes-based, as they are, on materials prices and wage
rates-actually understate the price levels of structures in 1840. 15 If
that is the case, using these indexes to deflate the 1840 values may
have produced an overstatement ofconstant price values in that year.
However, all the tests I have run so far suggest that this has not hap-
pened. On balance, the changes I have made in the constantprice series
have not been ofoverwhelming quantitative significance (in no year do
they amount to more than 10% of the value of the domestic capital
stock), but they are far from negligible, and since the adjustment for
1840 is in an upward direction, and the ones for 1870-1900 in a down-
ward direction, the rates oflong-term growth are lowerwhen computed.
with the new series than when computed with the old one, even when
the two series are put on the same conceptual basis.
The old series, expressed in constant prices, was never published,
but a set ofindex numbers based on it appeared in American Economic
Growth: An Economist's History of the United States (Davis et al.
1972). These index numbers provide the best bases for comparing the
old with the new series.
The comparisons can be made with data in table 4.3, which show
that the new series describe lower long-term rates ofgrowth than do
the old (panels A and C). The disparities are the wider when the new
series, inclusive ofall farmland improvements (variant A in the table),
is compared with the old series. That is reasonable enough, in view of
the conceptual difference between the two series and the well-known
fact that the agricultural sector grew at a slower pace, over the last six
decades of the century, than did the rest of the economy. But even
when the conceptual difference is removed-the variant B series is


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.182 Robert E. Gallman
what low,er long-term rates ofgrowth than do the old. The margins are
not great, however-less than half a percentage point in every case,
an adjustment of less than one-tenth in each of the long-term rates of
growth. The data on the decadal rates ofgrowth show, moreover, that
in only two decades-1840-50 and 1860-7Q-are the disparities in
growth rates at all wide (panel B). These are the decadal growth rates
that are affected by the major estimating changes described above, of
course. It should also be pointed out that the new and old series exhibit
the same patterns of change over time, the rate of growth rising from
1840-50 to 1850-60, falling to 1860-70, rising again to 1870-80 and
1880-90, and finally falling to 1890-1900.
On the whole, then, the new series differ from the old in important
respects, but once allowance is made for differences in concept and
coverage, they appear to tell roughly the same story with respect to
the rate ofgrowth ofthe capital stock. (The subject is treated further,
below.)
When Howle and I first came to this topic there were in the field two
sets of comprehensive capital stock estimates covering a substantial
part of the nineteenth century, Simon Kuznets's series, reported in
National Product since 1869 (1946), which cover the years 1880, 1890,
and 1900, and Raymond Goldsmith's revisions to the Kuznets figures
and extension ofthem to 1850, reported in Income and Wealth, series
2 (1952). There were also a good many sectoral estimates for the late
nineteenth century, deriving from a major program at the NBER in
which Creamer, Dobrovolsky, and Borenstein (1960), Ulmer (1960),
Grebler, et al. (1956), and Tostlebe (1957) participated. (See also Kuz-
nets 1961; Kendrick 1961.) Finally, there were a number of helpful
independent pieces of work, some of them developed in connection
with the Volume 24 and 30 meetings ofthis Conference: work by Fish-
low (1965, 1966), Cranmer (1960), Segal (1961), Primack (1962), Le-
bergott (1964), North (1960), and Simon (1960) (see also Gallman 1960).
Since then the research ofSoltow (1975) and Weiss (1967) has provided
additional materials that I have found helpful.
Howle and I began with Kuznets's National Product since 1869 (1946),
which provided us with the framework within which we have subse-
quently worked. The volume contains very detailed estimates, together
with full descriptions ofestimating procedures. Our idea was to modify
Kuznets's estimates in light of the work that had come forward since
National Product since 1869 was published, and to extend the estimates
to the years 1840, 1850, 1860, and 1870. The Goldsmith (1952) estimates
for 1850, while available in less detail, were to serve as an antebellum
benchmark.
The extent to which the new Gallman-Howle series now deviate from
the Kuznets and Goldsmith estimates is exhibited in table 4.4. It will183 The United States Capital Stock in the Nineteenth Century
Table 4.4 Ratios ofthe Goldsmith (1850, and Elsewhere Where Indicated)
and Kumets (1880-1900) Capital Stock Estimates (Current Prices),
to the New Gallman-Howle Estimates
1850
A. Fixed Reproducible Capital
1880 1890 1900








(not estimated by Gallman and Howle)
1.00 1.00 0.78
1.00 1.00 1.00
(1) Agriculture (variant B)a
(2) Mining
(3) Manufacturing








(10) Shipping, canals, and river improvements

















(1) Farm livestock 0.92 1.05 0.96 1.06
(2) Monetary metals 1.00 1.20 1.00 1.00
(3) Net international debits 1.36 0.69 0.97 1.12
(4) Other inventories 0.52 0.96 1.06 0.94
C. Totals
(1) Fixed reproducible capital (Kuznets)a 1.10 1.04 1.11
(2) National capital (Goldsmith)a 0.89 1.17 1.16 1.20
Sources: Goldsmith (1952); Kuznets (1946); data underlying Appendix.
aExcluding farmland improvements, other than structures.
be seen that in the cases offixed reproducible capital in farming, street
railroads, shipping, canals, river improvements, and pipelines and in
the cases of inventories of farm livestock and monetary metals, the
differences are slight. (In the cases of street railroads and pipelines
there are none at all.) For the rest, there are substantial differences.
As they relate to the Kuznets and Gallman-Howle estimates, they tend
to cancel out, so that the values ofaggregate fixed reproducible capital
fall within 11% of each other in each year, the Kuznets figures being
the higher. The net gaps between the Goldsmith and the new Gallman-
Howle estimates are wider, and they also run in opposite directions in
1850 and the later years. Thus the Goldsmith series describes a sub-
stantially higher rate ofgrowth across the nineteenth century than does
the Gallman-Howle series, even when differences ofconcept and cov-
erage are eliminated. 16184 Robert E. GaUman
Thedifferences betweenourworkandthatofGoldsmithand Kuznets
have emerged in part because we had available evidence unavailable
to them, in part because we have interpreted some of the evidence
available to all ofus in a new way, and in partbecause we have adopted,
here and there, different concepts. In the cases ofthe estimates relating
to agriculture, the "otherindustrial" (or "trade") sector, nonfarm res-
idences, steam railroads, telephones, canals and river improvements,
electric power and light, irrigation, tax-exempt property, and interna-
tional claims, we were the beneficiaries of substantial amounts of re-
search that came forward only after Goldsmith and Kuznets had pub-
lished. We did a certain amount ofnew research particularly with respect
to inventories andthetelegraph, and we workedoutnewinterpretations
of existing evidence in a number of places, notably in the cases of
mining and manufacturing (we believe that rented real estate was in-
advertently left out ofKuznets's manufacturing estimates). Finally, in
a number of cases (e.g., steam railroads, the telegraph) we chose to
substitute estimates ofnet reproduction cost for book value.
In summary, then, the new Gallman-Howle capital stock estimates
are net ofretirements and net ofcapital consumption. While a few of
the components (current prices) are expressed in book values, most
are in market prices or in net reproduction costs. Conceptually, the
new series differ importantly from the old; substantively, somewhat
less. The substantive differences between the new series and the Gold-
smith and Kuznets nineteenth-century series are wide enough that one
might anticipate that accounts ofeconomic structure and ~hange based
on the new series would offer an element ofnovelty. It is to this matter
that I now turn.
4.4 Capital and Economic Growth
4.4.1 Rates ofGrowth
To say that the nineteenth-century United States capital stock in-
creased rapidly or slowly is to make a comparative statement. It is to
say that the stock increased rapidly or slowly compared to other times-
earlierorlater--ortootherplaces. Sofar as earliertimes areconcerned,
Alice Jones's (1980) wealth data for 1774 and my own figures for the
early part ofthe nineteenth century would provide bases for a relevant
comparison. But my own estimates for the early part of the century
are not quite ready to be put to this use, and I am thus obliged to defer
this matter.
There is no reason to defer consideration ofsubsequent times, how-
ever. Raymond Goldsmith's recent extension of his estimates to 1980
provides us with data covering virtually the entire twentieth century185 The United States Capital Stock in the Nineteenth Century
(Goldsmith 1982). Thesedatadifferfrom theGoldsmith seriesdiscussed
in the previous section. The latter consisted chiefly of census-style
estimates, whereas the twentieth-century series were built up by per-
petual inventory procedures. In concept, the new Gallman-Howle vari-
ant B estimates are virtually identical to Goldsmith's twentieth-century
series. 17 Where the two overlap-at 1900-they are also substantively
quite similar. Where differences ofdetail appear, aggregating up to the
next relevant level virtually removes them. For example, the estimates
of agricultural structures and equipment differ, in the two series, in
1900, but the sums ofthe two-agricultural fixed capital-are virtually
identical. The same is true with respect to nonfarm residential land and
nonfarm residential structures. 18 Thus the two series link together rea-
sonably well, providing coverage for a period of 140 years, the link
being particularly good at the level of what I have called "domestic
wealth" (see sec. 4.1, above). Here, however, I will be comparing
Goldsmith's domestic capital series with the Gallman-Howle national
capital series. For present purposes, the consequences ofthe concep-
tual and substantive differences between the series are trivial.
According to Goldsmith, domestic capital (reproducible tangible as-
sets, narrow definition), in current prices, increased at an average an-
nual rate of 5.79% between 1901 and 1929, 5.00% between 1930 and
1953, and 8.20% between 1954 and 1980. These are, on the whole,
higher rates ofchange than are exhibited by the Gallman-Howle series
over similarly extended periods (see table 4.5), and this is true whether
one looks at the variant A or the variant B series. The explanation lies
in the price history of the two centuries. While prices rose and fell
dramatically in both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the long-
term drift in the former period was neither powerfully upward nor
powerfully downward. That is not true ofthe twentieth century, how-
ever. Prices moved strongly upward, on average, between 1901 and
1929, 1930 and 1953, and 1953 and 1980. Thus, deflating on the base
1929, one finds that the real capital stock increased at rates of only
3.60%, 1.68%, and 3.60% in the three periods, lower than most ofthe
rates exhibited in table 4.5. 19 Over the full sweep of the years 1900
through 1980, the current price series rose 6.36% per year, on average,
while the constant price series increased only 2.80%, the former sub-
stantially higher and the latter substantially lower than the long-term
nineteenth-century rates (see table 4.5). Comparing the experiences of
the two centuries, then, we find marked retardationofthe rateofgrowth
of the real magnitudes, just as had been previously discovered with
respect to the real national product (Gallman 1966).
By the standard of twentieth-century experience, the capital stock
grew rapidly between 1840 and 1900. My guess is that further work
will show that it also grew rapidly by the standard of what had gone186 Robert E. Gallman
Table 4.5 Rates of Growth ofthe National Capital Stock and the National
Product, 1840-1900
Variant Aa Variant Ba
Capital Stock GNPb Capital Stock GNP
A. Current Price Data
Long-term
1840-1900 4.4% 3.9% 5.0% 4.0%
Intermediate
1840-60 5.9 4.9 6.5 5.1
1860-1900 3.7 3.4 4.2 3.5
1870-1900 3.7 (2.9)C 4.1 (2.9)C
1860-80 3.3 4.1 3.9 4.2
1880-1900 4.1 2.7 4.5 2.7
Short-term
1840-50 4.9 3.8 5.6 4.2
1850-60 6.9 6.1 7.5 6.0
1860-70 3.8 (4.3)d 4.4 (4.3)d
1870-80 2.9 (3.7)e 3.4 (3.9)e
1880-90 5.1 2.5 5.7 2.6
1890-1900 3.1 2.8 3.3 2.8
B. Constant Price Data
Long-term
1840-1900 4.3% 4.0% 5.0% 4.1%
Intermediate
1840-60 5.0 4.7 6.0 5.0
1860-1900 4.0 3.6 4.4 3.7
1870-1900 4.8 (4.0)C 5.3 (4.l)c
1860-80 2.9 3.6 3.2 3.7
1880-1900 5.0 3.6 5.7 3.7
Short-term
1840-50 4.2 4.4 5.1 5.0
1850-60 5.8 4.9 6.9 4.9
1860-70 1.6 (3.0)d 2.0 (3.0)d
1870-80 4.2 (5.4)e 4.5 (5.6)e
1880-90 6.3 4.1 7.4 4.2
1890-1900 3.8 3.1 4.0 3.1
C. Implicit Price Index Numbers
1840 84 97(94)1 90 99(94)1
1850 89 91(95)1 94 91(96)1
1860 100 100 100 100
1870 123 (123)h 126 (123)h
1880 108 113 113 115
1890 97 97 97 97
1900 91 94 90 94
Sources: (1) Data underlying Appendix.
(2) GNP estimates: Variant B-Gallman (1966), p. 26, table A-I. (See note b above.)
Variant A---computed from Gallman (1966), pp. 26 and 35, tables A-I and A-4, variant
I, and the implicit price index of improvements to farmland (exclusive of structures)187 The United States Capital Stock in the Nineteenth Century
Table 4.5 (continued)
computed from data underlying the Appendix. GNP A is defined as conventional GNP
plus the value of improvements to farmland (table A-4 in Gallman 1966). I assume
that average annual improvements, 1849-58, were equal to improvements in 1859.
Constant price improvements (table A-4 in Gallman 1966) were converted to current
prices by means ofthe price index of agricultural land improvements (exclusive of
structures) implicit in the data underlying the Appendix. I assumed that the value of
improvements (current and constant prices) in 1839 and 1849 were equal to the mean
value, 1834-43 and 1844-54, respectively.
aThe variant A measures include improvements to agricultural land; the variant B
measures exclude all such improvements other than structures.





1870 Mean of 1869-78
1880 Mean of 1874-83
1890 Mean of 1884-93
1900 Mean of 1894-1903
cThese rates ofgrowth were computed from data for 1869-78 and 1894-1903 (means
ofannual data) and thus refer to the period 1873.5-1898.5.
dThese rates ofgrowth were computed from data for 1859 and 1869-79 (mean of
annual data) and thus refer to the period 1859-73.5.
eThese rates ofgrowth were computed from data for 1869-78 and 1874-83 (means of
annual data) and thus refer to the period 1873.5-78.5.
tThe dates to which the GNP estimates refer differ slightly from the dates in the stub:
Stub GNP Estimates
1840 Mean of 1834-43
1850 Mean of 1844-53
1860 1859
For the rest, see note b above.
8The implicit price indexes were computed from annual current price data (1839, 1849)
and decade average constant price data (1834-43, 1844-53)--see notes band f above.
The index numbers in parentheses were computed from annual data above (1839,
1849).
hRefers to the period 1869-78.
before. But what of the third standard mentioned above, that of ex-
perience in otherplaces? I am not yet in a position to make meaningful
direct comparisons ofthis type, but a fairly obvious indirect one can
be made. We know that the United States real national product in-
creased between the 1830s and 1900 at an exceptionally high rate, the
judgment resting on observations for many countries (Gallman 1966;
Davis et al. 1972, ch. 2). Unless the rates ofchange ofcapital stocks
and national products diverged widely-which is highly improbable-
the United States capital stock mustalso have grown rapidly, compared
with experience elsewhere. That means that the United States capital
stock was probably a relatively young one, with a high proportion of
the stock embodying best-practice techniques (Gallman 1978).188 Robert E. Gallman
Infact, the dataoftable 4.5 show that the capital stock actually grew
faster than the national product, in both current and constant prices,
in both variants, over long periods and over most ofthe short periods
identified in the table. That fact has a rather important set of impli-
cations. But before considering them, it will pay us to look at other
aspects of the evidence in the table.
Rates of change of both variants A and B of the capital stock are
contained in table 4.5. It will be observed that the rates of change of
the variant B series are always at least as large as the rates ofchange
ofthe variant A series, and usually larger. One should recall that the
variant A series includes investment in agricultural land clearing, fenc-
ing, and the construction of drainage and irrigation ditches, while the
variant B series does not. The variant A series grew the more slowly
because this component of the capital stock increased at a below-
average pace. This, in tum, was a consequence both of the fact that
the value ofimprovementsofthis type (measuredin reproductioncosts)
constituted a declining fraction of the value ofthe agricultural capital
stock (in both current and constant prices) and of the fact that the
agricultural sector-including the capital stock thereof-grew more
slowly than the rest ofthe economy. The former development reflected
both a slowing in the rate (percentage) at which agricultural land was
being added to the stock and the continued high rates of increase of
the stocks of agricultural structures and equipment, particularly the
latter. Agriculture was becoming more highly mechanized.
A second feature of the table worth remarking is that the rates of
growth recorded therein exhibit, on the whole, a downward long-term
movement. This is true of both of the GNP series, in current and
constant prices; both of the capital series, in current prices; and the
variant B series, in. constant prices. The variant A series, in constant
prices, is only a moderate exception. It exhibits lower rates ofgrowth
for the periods 1860-1900 and 1870-1900 than for 1840-60, which
makes it consistent with the variant B and GNPseries, but ifthe period
is broken into three equal lengths, the variant A series shows equal
rates of growth for 1840-60 and 1880-1900, the rate for the period
1860-80 being considerably lower. This is the one bit of evidence
running against a conclusion ofgeneral retardation in rates ofgrowth
across the latter part of the nineteenth century. The exception is not
a very important one, however, in view ofthe reservations expressed
above concerning the 1880 capital stock figure. Ifthe estimate for that
date is, indeed, biased downward, then an appropriate adjustment would
remove this one exception to the general finding of retardation in the
rates ofgrowth ofthe GNP and the capital stock, a development begun
in the nineteenth century and continued in the twentieth.
A third piece of information emerging from the table is that the
decade-to-decade variations in the rates ofgrowth ofthe GNP and the189 The United States Capital Stock in the Nineteenth Century
capital stock are reasonably consistent. Thus the long-swing boom of
the 1850s clearly emerges from the record provided by table 4.5, rates
ofgrowth rising above the levels attained in the 1840s (exception: the
current price GNP variant B series), while the rates of change of all
series drop sharply in the Civil War decade, 1860-70.20 Between 1870
and 1880 the rates ofchange ofthe current price series continue to fall,
reflecting the price deflation of the period, while the rates of change
of the real series all rise. All ofthese variations are reassuring. They
correspond to what one might have expected, from a knowledge ofthe
qualitative history ofthe period and ofquantitative studies ofa micro
variety. It is also reasonable to expect the rates ofchange ofthe GNP
and capital stock series to move together as they do. These features
ofthe table thus enhance one's confidence in the capital stock series,
but (necessarily) offer no new insights into the period.
The consistency in the movements ofthe rates ofchange ofthe two
sets ofseries ends with 1880. Thereafter, the rate ofgrowth ofthe GNP
series, expressed in constant prices, falls persistently, while the rate
ofgrowth ofthe current price series falls and then rises. The rates of
change ofthe current and constant price stock series follow neither of
these patterns, rising between 1880 and 1890 and falling between 1890
and 1900. Thus the variations in the rates of growth of the GNP and
capital stock series diverge across the last two decades ofthe century.
Once again, ifthe capital stock estimate for 1880 is, indeed, too low,
adjusting it might bring the patterns ofchange ofthe two series more
nearly into line.
4.4.2 Sources ofGrowth
Finally, the data in table 4.5 offer the opportunity to rework the
"sources ofgrowth" calculations that I derived on the basis ofthe old
Gallman and Howle series and presented on two earlier occasions
(Davis et al. 1972; Gallman 1980). The results of this reworking, to-
gether with the old figures, appear in table 4.6. In making my revisions
I have left everything unchanged from the earlier set of calculations,
with the following exceptions: in the case ofthe new calculations based
on the variant B series, I recomputed the contributions ofthe capital
stock and productivity; in the case of the new calculations based on
the variant A series, I recomputed the contributions of capital, pro-
ductivity, and land. The variant B series is conceptually identical to
the old Gallman-Howle series, it will be recalled. It was therefore
possible to substitute it into the calculations without changing anything
else, except, ofcourse, for the contribution ofproductivity change to
economic growth. Since productivity change is taken as a residual, the
introduction ofa new capital stock series necessarily produced changes
in the productivity figures. The variant A series differs conceptually
from the old Gallman and Howle series, incorporatingelements ofvalue190 Robert E. Gallman
Table 4.6 Contributions ofFactor Inputs and Productivity to the Growth of





Estimate Variant A Variant B
1900-1960
Old Estimate
A. Average Annual Rates ofGrowth
I. Net national product
1. Labor force 1.88% 1.88% 1.88% 1.09%
2. Land supply 0.38 0.13 0.38 0.08
3. Capital stock 1.03 1.12 0.94 0.58
4. Productivity 0.69 0.85 0.78 1.38
5. Totals 3.98 3.98 3.98 3.12
II. Net national product per capita
1. Labor force 0.17% 0.17% 0.17% 0.11%
2. Land supply 0.05 0.02 0.05 -0.01
3. Capital stock 0.55 0.42 0.46 0.28
4. Productivity 0.69 0.85 0.78 1.31
5. Totals 1.46 1.46 1.46 1.69
B. Percentage Distributions
I. Net national product
1. Labor force 47.2% 47.2% 47.2% 34.8%
2. Land supply 9.6 3.3 9.6 2.5
3. Capital stock 25.9 28.1 23.6 18.6
4. Productivity 17.3 21.4 19.6 44.1
5. Totals 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
II. Net national product per capita
1. Labor supply 11.6% 11.6% 11.6% 6.7%
2. Land supply 3.6 1.6 3.6 -0.6
3. Capital stock 37.5 28.6 31.5 16.4
4. Productivity 47.3 58.2 53.3 77.5
5. Totals 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Sources: All ofthesefigures, exceptthe ones labeled "Land supply, variantA," "Capital
stock, variants A and B," and "Productivity, variants A and B" were taken from Davis
et ale (1972), table 2.12, and Gallman (1980), tables 1and 2 orwere computed from these
tables or their underlying data.
Theproductivityfigures inpanel A were takenas residuals. ThedatainpanelA labeled
"Capital stock, variants A and B" were derived by weighting rates of change with
appropriate income share weights. The rates ofchange were taken from table 3.5, above
(in the case of panel A, part I) or were computed by subtracting the rate of change of
population from the rate of change in table 3.5 (in the case of panel A, part II). The
income share weight for the variant B series (0.19) was taken from the notes to table
2.12 ofDavis et ale (1972). The income share weight for the variant A capital series (0.26)
was computed by raising the variant B weight in the same proportion as the variant A
capital stock figure (current prices) exceeds the variant B figure, in 1860. The average
annual rate ofchange ofthe variant A land supply figure was computed from Historical
Statistics (1960), sere K-2, 1850-1900. The income share weight (0.06) was computed
by subtracting the capitalstock weight (0.26) from the sum ofthe land and capital stock
weights (0.32) employed for the variant B calculations.191 The United States Capital Stock in the Nineteenth Century
attributed to land in the old Gallman-Howle framework. Substituting
variant A into the calculations therefore required reestimating the land
supply and the system ofweights to be attached to the rates ofchange
ofcapital and land.21 The details ofthese calculations are given in the
notes to the table.
Table 4.6 is organized as a set of "sources ofgrowth" calculations
of the type made popular by Edward Denison. Panel A shows the
contribution of each factor of production and productivity change to
the rate of growth of real net national product and real net national
product per capita. Panel B displays these figures in the form of per-
centile distributions.
The calculations based on the old series invited the conclusion that
nineteenth-century growth could be attributed chiefly to increases in
the supply offactors ofproduction, in contradistinction to that ofthe
twentieth century, in which productivity change was the leading source
ofgrowth. The new capital stock series do not oblige us to change this
view dramatically. But they do argue for the assignment ofa somewhat
larger importance to nineteenth-century productivity change than re-
cent custom has accorded it. In particular, use ofthe variant A series
leads to the conclusion that productivity change accounted for almost
six-tenths ofthe growth ofper capita NNP in the nineteenth century.
This is lower than the figure recorded for the twentieth century (almost
eight-tenths), but is by no means low. The term "productivity" covers,
ofcourse, the influences ofa multitude offorces operating on output.
Perhaps a more meaningful way to put the conclusion is to say that
the calculations in table 4.6 (variant A) assign to the factor inputs,
narrowly defined, responsibility for only a little more than two-fifths
of the increase in per capita real national product across the last six
decades ofthe nineteenth century. The role ofother forces, therefore,
cannot be regarded as small.
4.4.3 Capital/Output Ratios
The capital stock increased faster than the national product, ac-
cording to the dataoftable 4.5. This means that the capital/output ratio
was rising; the economy was engaged in capital deepening. Table 4.7
is organized to describe this process. The data leave something to be
desired because, for the period before the Civil War, some ofthe ratios
depend upon data referring to individual years. The ratios, therefore,
are influenced by events peculiar to these years and may not be fully
representative ofthe period, 1840-60. The postwar estimates are less
susceptible to this criticism, since the national product dataare decade
averages, centered roughly on the years to which the capital stock
figures refer (see the notes to the table). One should remember, also,
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.193 The United States Capital Stock in the Nineteenth Century
1880 rest on capital stock data that are probably less strong than the
data for the other years. Differences in ratios between one year and
the next should not be given undue importance. It is the general drift
ofthe ratios that should be the focus ofour interest.
The aggregate capital/output ratios (first two columns) do, in fact,
rise over time, and this is true of both the variant A and variant B
series, in current and constant prices. The variant A ratios are much
larger than the variant B ratios, indicating the great quantitative sig-
nificance ofthe component ofcapital consisting offarmland clearing,
fencing, and so on (see, also, the fourth column), components included
in variant Abut not variant B. The variant A ratios also rise less rapidly
than the variant B ratios, reflecting the declining relative importance
of these forms of agricultural land improvement. But both series, in
currentand constantprices, exhibitafairly markedincrease, orperhaps
it would be best to speak oftwo increases. All ofthe series show some
rise before the Civil War, a decline to the first two postwar dates for
which we have ratios, and then a more pronounced increase to the end
ofthe century.
The lastfour columns show that the increase ofthe aggregate capitall
output ratio reflects exclusively developments with respect to equip-
ment and improvements (other than' agricultural land improvements).
In current prices, inventories increased about as fast as the national
product, the inventory/output ratio changing little. In constant prices
it actually declined moderately. The ratio of farm improvements to
national product fell quite dramatically, especially in constant prices,
for reasons discussed above. On the other hand, the ratios of "other
improvements" and of machinery and equipment to output rose vig-
orously, the latterparticularly in the constant price variant; the relative
prices of machinery and equipment were falling dramatically. By the
end ofthe century the structure ofthe capital stock had changed strik-
ingly. Whereas in 1840 farm improvements were the most important
components ofcapital, accounting for over two-thirds ofthe value of
the stock in constant prices, by 1900 their share had fallen to about a
third. Machinery and equipment, composing barely one-twentieth of
the stock (constant prices) in 1840, were over one-quarter ofthe stock
in 1900. Accompanying the capital deepening there was, then, a sub-
stantial reshaping of the stock, with new forms of capital rising to
prominence.
The lastfour columns ofthe table also throw some light on the nature
ofthe decline in the capital/output ratio between 1860 and 1875. Changes
in the ratios ofinventories, equipment, and "other improvements" to
output clearly are not responsible. The first rose moderately, in both
current and constant prices, whereas the othertwo eitherchanged very
little (equipment, in current prices), or rose vigorously (equipment, in194 Robert E. Gallman
constantprices; "otherimprovements," in currentprices). Butthe ratio
of "farm improvements" to GNP declined very sharply (especially in
current prices) and played a major role in the observed capital shal-
lowing for the economy as a whole. This development may reflect the
effects ofthe Civil War. In the South, some improved land was allowed
to return to nature during the War, while in the North the pace at which
land was improved slackened for lack oflabor. One would think that
the effects of the War on improved land would have been largely re-
moved by 1875, but it may be that the value ofimprovements had not
yet attained the level it would have reached had there been no war.
A second factor also bears on the change in the aggregate capital/
output ratio between 1860 and 1875. Bear in mind that the numerator
ofthe ratio is the national capital stock, an aggregate (variant A) com-
posed of the four components discussed above-inventories, equip-
ment, farm improvements, and other improvements-plus net claims
on foreigners. The latteris represented only indirectly in the table; that
is, there is no column containing estimates of "net claims"/output
ratios, paralleling the last four columns. The reason is that net claims
represented a negative value in all the years of the table, a relatively
small one in most ofthem. Between 1860 and 1875, however, the size
ofthis variable increased, going from a small negative value in 1860 to
a very large one in 1875. This was also probably a consequence ofthe
Civil War, which increased the volume of negotiable American debt,
altered the disposition ofAmerican savings, and changed the American
balance of trade. In any case, this phenomenon also played a role in
the decline ofthe capital/output ratio between 1860 and 1875 (William-
son 1974).
An indication ofthe importance ofthis matteris easily obtained. The
sum of the ratios in the last four columns of the table in each year
approximates the variant A ratio ofdomestic capital to GNP. The dif-
ference between this sum and the value in the first column measures
the effect of net claims on foreigners on the national capital/output
ratio. The sums and the entries from column 1 for 1860 and 1875 are
as shown in the unnumbered table below. The sums are almost identical
with the first column values in 1860, but larger than the first column
values in 1875. More to the point, the sums drop slightly between the
two years, in constant prices, while they fall more dramatically, in
current prices. The decline in the aggregate national capital/output
ratio, then, reflects both changes in the international circumstances of
the United States and changes in the agricultural sector, both sets of
changes probably being legacies ofthe Civil War.
In table 4.8 I have gathered together data at the industrial sectoral
level, with the object ofseeing how pervasive the trend toward higher


















caution. All ofthe sectoraloutputdata(value added) are discrete, being
distributed at 10-year intervals from 1840 to 1900. Ratios measured
from such data are likely to be unstable, particularly when computed
for narrow industrial sectors. Furthermore, since I am unable to dis-
tribute all inventories accuratelyamongindustrialsectors, I was obliged
to leave them out ofaccount here and measure only fixed capital. The
variations among these sectoral ratios in the table may not accurately
represent sectoral variations in more comprehensively defined capitaV
output ratios. In particular, the ratios in the table probably understate
the relative degree to which the "commerce" sector held capital. Ad-
ditionally, the agricultural value-added data underlying lines l(a) and
(b) and 8(a) and (b) should have been adjusted to conform precisely to
the variant A and B concepts. I did not make these adjustments, taking
the dataexactlyas they came from the source. Otheradjustments could
easily be imagined, and I preferred not to be drawn into work along
these lines at this time, work which is quite unlikely to alter the general
results emerging from table 4.8 in any case.
Finally, it should be said that the sectoral value-added data have
never been fully reconciled with the GNP data forming the bases of
tables 4.5 and 4.7. When obvious conceptual or measurement differ-
ences between the two are eliminated (differences pertaining to the
handling ofthe international sector and farm improvements), the sum
of the value-added series exceeds the value of the GNP series in all
years but one, the margin between the two widening over time. That
is a reasonable result, in a general way. The aggregated value-added
series are less net than the GNP series, the value ofintermediate ser-
vices being double-counted in the former but not· in the latter. One
would suppose that such duplication probably increased in relative
importance as time passed. The value-added and GNP series, then,
may be fully reconcilable. But since the former exhibits a higher rate
ofgrowth than the latter (due to the double-counting of intermediate
services in the former), it follows that capital/output ratios computed
from the former will show less tendency to rise over time than will
capital/output ratios computed from the latter. That must be borne in
mind when tables 4.7 and 4.8 are compared.22
I begin with three sectors: agriculture; mining, manufacturing, and




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































7198 Robert E. Gallman
are relatively strong (that is, compared with the estimates on which
the other ratios in the table depend), the capital and value-added es-
timates are independent in each case, and the sectors are sufficiently
broad so that one can hope for a modicum of stability in the ratios.
All ofthe series, except for agriculture, variant A, show quite pro-
nounced upward movements over time. The variant A series shows no
very clear trend, in either current or constant prices. The variant B
series and the ratios for the "all other private business" sector rise
strongly before the Civil War, flatten out between 1860 and 1880, and
then rise again strongly, while the "mining, manufacturing, and hand
trades" sector exhibits a ratio that neither rises nor falls before the
War, but increases strongly from 1860 to 1900, in both current and
constantprices. Itwouldbefair to say, then, thatthe upward movement
of the national capital/output ratio (table 4.7) represents a fairly per-
vasive movement, affecting the chief industrial sectors.
These conclusions are moderated only slightly if we look within the
"all other private business" sector and observe the ratios for its two
dissimilar components, "Transportation and Public Utilities" and
"Commerce and All Other Private Business." The ratios for the former
are fairly volatile but show no long-term trend. That is not the case for
the latter, the ratios for which move strongly upward to 1860, show no
trend for the next twenty years, but rise pronouncedly again across
the last twenty years.
The ratios for the remaining two sectors, government and education,
and farm and nonfarm residences, also rise strongly and quite persis-
tently, but there are reasons to place less emphasis on these data. The
first sector is a very small one, and the capital stock data, with respect
to government, refer only to buildings, while the education capital data
include land as well as capital. Thus the evidence is not entirely apposite.
There are even more serious problems with respect to the residential
sector. The denominator of the ratio includes the shelter value of all
residences, farm and nonfarm. Since the capital stock series do not
distinguish farm residences, I was obliged to include all farm buildings
in the numerator, which means that all ofthe ratios for this sector are
biased upward. Furthermore, the denominator was initially estimated
on the basis of capital stock data (see Gallman and Weiss 1969), al-
though not the capital stock data appearing in the numerators ofthese
ratios. Thus the ratios cannot be taken very seriously. I include them
for the sake ofcompleteness and because the data do figure, in another
form, in table 4.7, and the readeris thereforeentitledto know something
about them.
Whether or not the estimating procedures were proper (for the pur-
pose of measuring the capitaVoutput ratio), the relationships obtained
between value added and the capital stock ofthe "residences" sector
are plausible. Reversing the ratios and adding landto residentialcapital,199 The United States Capital Stock in the Nineteenth Century
we have estimates ofthe rate ofreturn (gross) to residential property.
The computed rate follows fairly closely the pattern ofthe interest rate
(at leastfrom 1860 onward), a result which might have been anticipated
on theoretical grounds. Thus at least the value-added and capital stock
data for this sector seem consistent.
The point draws attention to a factor that figured in the upward drift
of all the capital/output ratios. The interest rate was falling through
most of the postwar period. This was certainty true of the nominal
rate, and probably true ofthe real rate as well (see Davis and Gallman
1978). This development affected the capital/output ratio-as I have
measured it-in two ways. First, a declining interest rate, ceteris pari-
bus, leads to a rise in the market value of the existing capital stock.
(Bear in mind that many ofthe capital values underlying table 4.8 are
market values.) The increase in market value, ceteris paribus, induces
investment, since market price exceeds reproduction cost. A falling
interestrate, then, produces a temporary rise in the capital/outputratio,
reflecting nominal changes only, but in the long run it produces an
increase based on real phenomena: capital deepening. The actual in-
terest rate reductions of the postwar period were sufficiently gradual
that I think we are entitled to suppose that the increases in the ratios
described in tables 4.7 and 4.8 rest chiefly on real, not nominal,
developments.
The capital/output ratios in table 4.8 differ widely from one sector
to the next. In some measure this reflects no more than the fact that
the data exclude certain types of capital. But that is certainly not all
there is to it. The residential and transportation and public utilities
sectors were, in fact, more capital intensive than were the secondary
sectors, for example. Since the structure ofthe economy was changing
in important ways, the level of the aggregate capital/output ratio may
have been influenced by the shifting relative importance ofthe various
sectors. Lines 6(a)-(d) and 7(a)-(d) were computed to help settle that
issue. The lines contain various weighted average capital/output ratios,
sets ofcalculations appearing for both variant A and B estimates, and
for both all sectors and all exceptthe questionable''residences" sector.
In one set ofcalculations, 6(a) and (b) and 7(a) and (b), sectoral value-
added weights were held constant and sectoral capital/output ratios
were allowed to vary over time; in the other, 6(c) and (d) and 7(c) and
(d), capital/output ratios were held constant while value-added weights
were allowed to change over time. The first set ofcalculations shows
the effects ofrising sectoral ratios on the aggregate ratio, no allowance
being made for the effects of structural changes. In the second set,
only structural changes influence the weighted averages.
The calculations show that the structural changes of the economy
either produced no direct net long-term effect on the aggregate ratio,
as in line 6(d), or else reduced the ratio. The entire increase in the200 Robert E. Gallman
aggregate ratio was occasioned by developments within sectors. The
explanation lies, ofcourse, in the nature ofthe structural change that
took place. The two sectors that exhibited the most pronounced alter-
ations in their relative importance were agriculture and industry (min-
ing, manufacturing, and hand trades), the former experiencing a pro-
nounced loss in its share in aggregate value added, the latter a
pronouncedgain. Theformerhada high depreciablecapital/outputratio
(especially in the variant A form), the latter a very low one. The clear
tendency ofthe exchange in degrees ofrelative importance ofthe two
sectors was to force down the overall capital/output ratio. Two less
pronouncedcompositional shifts in aggregate value added had the same
effect. The "residences" sector, with a very high capital/output ratio,
experienced a moderate loss in relative importance, while the "com-
merce, etc." sector, with a low ratio, gained in relative importance.23
The one structural change that worked against the downward move-
ment of the overall ratio was the growing relative size of the trans-
portation and public utilities sector, with its exceptionally large capital/
output ratio.
All ofthese structural developments were interrelated: all were part
ofthegeneralprocessofmodernization, whichconsistedofthe transfer
ofeconomic activities into the orbit ofthe market, increasing special-
ization and trade, and the movement of information and goods over
longer distances and at faster rates.
While these structural changes had no pronounced direct effect on
the depreciable capital/output ratio,24 they did influence the means by
which the capital stockwas assembled. Intheantebellum years, almost
halfofthe depreciable capital stock (constant prices) consisted ofag-
riculturalland improvements, many of them created by family labor,
orthe laborattached to the plantationonwhich they were constructed,
or by other local sources oflabor. These works were typically carried
out in the offseason-in the spaces in the agricultural year when there
were no pressing tasks, such as planting orharvesting, associated with
the growing crops. Little external finance was required to carry them
out. But the structural changes of modernization brought to the fore
industries, forms ofcapital, and organizational scales ofoperation that
enhanced the roles ofmarkets and ofexternal finance in the provision
ofcapital.25 Thus the relative stability in the weighted averages oflines
6(c), 6(d), 7(c), and 7(d) mask important developments with respect to
American capital formation and finance.
The capital/output ratio can rise ifthe rate ofgrowth ofoutput falls
(without a compensating fall in the net investment proportion) orifthe
net investment proportion (net investment to output) rises (without a
compensating increase in the rate of growth of output), or if some
combinationofthesedevelopments occurs.26Thedataoftable4.5 show201 The United States Capital Stock in the Nineteenth Century
that the rate of growth of output-GNP-did, in fact, decline during
the nineteenth century. But what happened to the net investment pro-
portion? Table 4.9 is organized to answer this question.
There are two ways ofmeasuring the United States investment pro-
portion during the last six decades of the nineteenth century. Net in-
vestment can be measured across each decade after 1840 as the incre-
ment in the capital stock between the terminal dates ofthe decade. It
can then be combined with estimates of the value of flows of com-
modities and services to consumers (1839-48, 1849-58, etc. [Gallman
1960, p. 27]) to form estimates ofnet product (table 4.9, cols. 1, 2, and
4). This procedure does not result in useful estimates if current price
stock data are employed; thus the estimates in table 4.9 all rest on
constant price data. It should be said, however, that even the constant
Table 4.9 Capital Formation Proportions, Constant Prices, 1839-48
through 1889-98
National Capital Depreciable Capital
Variant B Variant B
Variant A
Year Net Net Gross Net I Net II Gross I Gross II
1839-48 12.1% 9.6% 14.3% 6.0% 5.6% 11.1% 10.6%
1849-58 15.7 13.3 18.8 10.7 8.8 16.5 14.8
1869-78 12.8 10.7 18.4 7.3 15.4 15.5 22.3
1879-88 18.3 17.5 25.9 15.4 13.4 24.1 22.6
1889-98 14.8 13.8 26.4 11.1 15.7 24.5 27.9
1839-58 14.4 12.0 17.4 9.0 7.3 14.8 13.1
1869-98 15.6 14.5 25.1 11.9 14.3 23.0 25.0
Sources:
The denominator of each ratio is the sum of the numerator plus the value of flows to
consumers, prices of 1860 (Gallman 1960, p. 27, col. 5). The numerators are as follows:
Col. 1: Increment to the national capital stock, Variant A, 1860 prices, 1840-50, 1850-
60, etc.
Col. 2: Increment to the national capital stock, Variant B, 1860 prices, 1840-50, 1850-
60, etc.
Col. 3:The numerators from col. 2 plus capital consumption, the latterestimated at 10%
ofthe value ofmachinery and equipmentand4%ofthe valueofimprovements (exclusive
offarmlandclearing, etc.). Theseestimatesapproximate straight-linecapitalconsumption
on the assumptions that machinery and equipment had a useful life of 15 years and that
the stock was, on average, 5 years old, and that improvements had a useful life of 40
years and that the stock was, on average, 15 years old.
Col. 4: Increment to the depreciable capital stock (machinery, equipment, and improve-
ments), exclusive offarmland clearing, etc.
Col. 5: The numerators ofcol. 7 minus the capital consumption allowances underlying
col. 3.
Col. 6: The numerators of col. 4 plus the capital consumption allowances underlying
col. 3.
Col. 7: Gallman (1960), p. 34, col. 1 plus col. 2.202 Robert E. Gallman
price estimatesleave somethingto be desired, in viewofthe moderately
ambiguous conceptual character of the stock estimates (see sec. 4.2
above).
In the second procedure, net investment flows are estimated by sub-
tracting from gross investment flows (Gallman 1960, p. 34) the value
of capital consumption (table 4.9, col. 5). The latter can be estimated
from the capital stock data, given estimates of the average age and
useful life ofthe various components ofthe depreciable capital stock.
The flow data are ofsuch a character that investment proportions can
be estimated for depreciable capital. Given estimates of capital con-
sumption, it is also possible to generate gross investment shares, in
which the measurement of gross investment depends exclusively on
stock data (table 4.9, col. 3, 6). Of course, gross share estimates can
also be made directly from the flow data (table 4.9, col. 7). Since, as
I have previously indicated, the stock and flow data are not fully con-
sistent, I have chosen to make estimates of investment proportions
based on both sets ofdata, so that the full range ofresults obtainable
from the datais exhibited. The table does notexhaustall ofthe possible
investment proportion estimates, however. To keep it from becoming
unduly complex I have restricted myself to four estimates of the net
proportion and three ofthe gross proportion.
All of the columns of table 4.9 devoted to the net proportion show
it drifting upward overtime. The movement is not uniformly persistent:
the ratio actually falls between 1849-58 and 1869-78, as well as be-
tween 1879-88 and 1889-98, in the series depending exclusively on
the stock estimates. This is not, however, altogether unexpected. As
I have previously indicated, the 1880 stock estimate may be too low.
Adjusting it upward appropriately might eliminate the first decline,
although not the second. In any case, it would be expecting too much
to hope to establish the timing of the upward movement of the pro-
portion exactly with data of this type. More important is the fact of
the long-term upward movement, a fact that emerges clearly in the
data in the last two lines ofthe table-more clearly from the flow data
(col. 5) than from the stock data (cols. 1, 2, 4), however, and from the
measures incorporating a narrow definition ofcapital (cols. 2 and, par-
ticularly, 4) than from the ones based on a broad definition (col. 1).27
The increase in the net investment proportion required an even more
pronounced increase in the gross investment proportion (cols. 3, 6, and
7). The explanation is not far to seek: the rising depreciable capital/
output ratio meant that, ceteris paribus, the share ofcapital consump-
tion in national product was rising. But other things were not, in fact,
equal: the structure ofthe depreciable capital stock was changing, the
shorter-lived machinery and equipment increasing in importance rel-
ative to the longer-lived improvements. This structural change in-203 The United States Capital Stock in the Nineteenth Century
creased the share of national product accounted for by capital
consumption.
These two developments meant that the share ofthe GNP (concept
adopted by Gallman 1960) accounted for by gross investment more
than doubled between the 1840s and 1890s. One must further remember
that the forms of investment and their relationships with the market
were changing. The requirements for a rich and well articulated system
ofintermediation were expanding.
The forces operating to raise the investment proportion, while they
have already received considerable attention in the literature, would
surely reward additional work. This paper-intended to introduce the
new capital series-is not the place to pursue them. But it does seem
to me that the definitive work on this subject will have to come to
terms with the changing structure ofthe economy and the developing
system ofintermediation. The pursuit ofthis topic will surely be made
easier and more successful with the publication of Raymond Gold-
smith's forthcoming book on national balance sheets through history.
4.5 Concluding Remarks
Section 4.4 is a brief precis of some of the main results derivable
from the new capital stock series. Limitations of space prevent me
from adding to these results and showing more clearly the place of
capital in nineteenth-century history. I have been concerned here chiefly
to introduce the new series, to explain their pedigrees and character,
and to show the principal conclusions to which I have been drawn as
a result ofmulling them overand comparing them with related variables.204 Robert E. Gallman
Appendix
4.A.l Capital Stock Estimates, Variants A and B, Current and Constant (1860)
Prices, 1840-1900 (Billions of DoHan)
1840 1850 1860 1870 1880 1890 1900
Current Prices
Variant A
1. National wealth 7.89 16.39 24.21 32.22 54.92 73.12
2. Domestic wealth 7.95 16.51 25.24 33.30 56.66 73.93
3. National capital 3.89 6.27 12.27 17.80 23.79 38.98 52.97
4. Domestic capital 4.07 6.33 12.39 18.83 24.77 40.71 53.79
5. Improvements 2.59 4.02 8.23 12.00 15.78 26.94 35.15
6. EquipmentC 0.38 0.58 1.09 1.60 2.31 4.47 6.59
7. Inventoriesa C 1.10 1.74 3.07 5.23 6.68 9.30 12.05
8. International sectorb C -0.18 -0.06 -0.12 -1.04 -1.08 -1.74 -0.82
Variant B
1. National wealth 5.96 13.06 20.12 27.61 49.31 66.17
2. Domestic wealth 6.03 13.18 21.15 28.70 51.04 66.99
3. National capital 2.52 4.35 8.94 13.71 19.08 33.37 46.02
4. Domestic capital 2.69 4.41 9.06 14.74 20.17 35.10 46.83
5. Improvements 1.22 2.09 4.90 7.91 11.18 21.33 28.20
Constant Prices
Variant A
1. National capital 4.65 7.02 12.30 14.52 21.90 40.38 58.38
2. Domestic capital 4.83 7.09 12.43 15.23 22.91 42.35 59.31
3. Improvements 3.14 4.58 8.26 9.99 13.98 23.71 31.32
4. EquipmentC 0.25 0.44 1.09 1.55 2.85 9.02 15.75
5. Inventoriesa C 1.44 2.06 3.07 3.69 6.08 9.63 12.25
6. International sectorb C -0.18 -0.07 -0.12 -0.71 -1.00 -1.97 -0.93
Variant B
1. National capital 2.80 4.62 8.97 10.91 16.94 34.53 51.12
2. Domestic capital 2.97 4.69 9.10 11.63 17.94 36.50 52.05
3. Improvements 1.29 2.18 4.93 6.39 9.02 17.85 24.06
Sources: See text.
aExcluding inventories of monetary metals.
bIncluding inventories of monetary metals.
cSame in Variants A and B.20S The United States Capital Stock in the Nineteenth Century
Notes
1. This paper, however, is concerned exclusively with the period 1840-1900.
2. Thetopics treatedin sec. 4.2areofatypethathas beendiscussedatearliermeetings
ofthe Conference. See, in particular, volumes 2, 12, 14, 19,25,29, and 45, and especially
the papers by Edward Denison, Raymond Goldsmith, Simon Kuznets, Nancy and Rich-
ard Ruggles, and Dan Usher, and the comments on them.
3. The following discussion was developed with fixed capital chiefly in mind, although
it can also be made to apply to inventories and international claims, with two exceptions:
there is no clear correspondence between "acquisition cost" and any single system of
inventory accounting. For present purposes, that is not an important matter. All inven-
tories treated herein are valued at market prices. So far as international claims are
concerned, there is no good counterpart ofreproduction cost (other than market price).
4. A fourth method-not relevant to the series of this paper, and therefore left un-
discussed here-measures capital in terms ofits currentcapacity to produce output. The
problemsofdefining capacityandofmeasuring it, in a meaningful way, areably discussed
in the papers by Denison and by Nancy and Richard Ruggles and the comments on these
papers in vols. 19 (1957) and 26 (1961) of Studies in Income and Wealth.
5. But see n. 3.
6. Whether loss of value due to obsolescence should figure in capital consumption
has been hotly debated. See, e.g., the Denison and Ruggles papers, cited above, and
the comments on them in vols. 19 (1957) and 26 (1961). As a practical matter, it almost
always does. In this paper, I bow to practice and take no final stand on the theoretical
issue, although the case of those who accept obsolescence as a factor in capital con-
sumption seems to me the stronger of the two. (Similar arguments apply to casualty
losses.)
7. I ignore here the problems posed by taxes and subsidies, problems of modest
dimensions throughout most ofthe nineteenth century.
8. See also Kuznets's objection, voiced in his paper in Vol. 2 of Studies in Income
and Wealth (1938).
9. This is particularly true with respect to the manufacturing sector, which was ex-
periencing extraordinarily high rates ofgrowth.
10. That is, the fit for 1840 is almost as good as the fit for 1850 or 1860; the fit for
1870 is at least as good as the fit for 1880, 1890, or 1900. See Gallman (1985), table 4.
11. Following Kuznets (1946), we produced a separate set ofestimates-distinct from
the agricultural estimates--of irrigation improvements, which we treated as part of the
capital stock.
12. For present purposes, the "old" series is the one published in Gallman (1965),
which includes some components ofwealth (e.g., inventories) missing from the original
Gallman and Howle series.
13. Since in these years most of the adjustments have the same sign, the gross dif-
ferences are about the same as the net ones.
14. The index depends on Lebergott's (1964) wage series, the Warren and Pearson
building materials index (1932), and data on rail prices from the American Iron and Steel
Association (1912).
15. The Brady building price indexes exhibit more pronounced long-term downward
movements than are observable in construction wages and materials prices series.
16. Goldsmith and Kuznets apparently include farmland improvements--other than
structures-with land, rather than with capital.
17. See Goldsmith (1982), p. 32, for a statement of the valuation system followed in
assembling the series. The Goldsmith series excludes net claims on foreigners.
18. These results were worked out from Goldsmith et al. (1963), 2:71, which is the
source ofthe 1900 data in Goldsmith (1982).
19. It is well known that the deflation base selected can affect the rate of change of
a real capital stock series, earlier bases typically producing higher rates ofgrowth than
late ones. It is therefore fortunate, for present purposes, that the deflation bases of the
two series being considered here occupy similar relative temporal positions. Thus the206 Robert E. GaUman
Goldsmith series is deflated on the base 1929, 28 years from the first year in the series
and 51 from the last; the Gallman and Howle series, on 1860, 20 years from the first
year in that series and 40 years from the last.
20. Throughout I use the dating scheme relevant to the capital stock series (1840,
1850, etc.). Notice thattheGNPseries is dated todifferent yearsfrom these, the disparity
being particularly wide in the case ofthe first post-Civil War date. See the notes to table
4.5.
21. Land, in these calculations, is restricted to agricultural land.
22. The ratios ofthe sum ofthe value-added measures to GNP, variant A, are:
1839 1849 1859 1869 1879 1889 1899
1.03 .98 1.01 1.03 1.04 1.17 1.16
Correcting the value-added and GNPestimates to put them both on the same basis, with
respect to the treatment offarm improvements (variant A concept) and the international
sector (Le.;leaving changes in claims against foreigners out ofboth sets of measures),
and deducting from the value-added series those elements that are most likely to involve
double-counting (value added by steam railroads, public utilities, banks, fire and marine
insurance, lawyers and engineers, "all other" professionals, and the independent hand
trades), the ratios become:
1839 1849 1859 1869 1879 1889 1899
1.05 .94 .96 .92 .93 1.00 1.00
The reconciliation between the two series is by no means perfect; the upward movement
ofthe ratio from 1879 to 1889 is more than negligible. Nonetheless, the long-term trend
is much reduced in the second tabulation, as compared with the first, and the variations
from· one year to the next are not large, in the context ofthe observed annual changes
in GNP.
23. Ifthe measure ofcapital employed here had included inventories, this result might
have been different.
24. The indirect effects, through changing supply and demand conditions for capital
goods, constitute another matter. The rapid expansion in the stock of machinery and
equipment, for example-a development that, we have seen, played a role in the rise of
the overall capital/output ratio--was related to the revolutionary growth ofthe industrial
sector (mining, manufacturing, hand trades).
25. See Davis and Gallman (1973) for a treatment ofthese ideas in the context ofthe
changing financial structure ofthe United States.
26. See Davis and Gallman (1973) for an effort to work through an analysis of this
type in quantitative terms, making use ofthe old Gallman-Howle capital stockestimates.
27. Notice that the postwar pattern ofchange differs between the estimates based on
the stock and flow data. In the former series, the net proportion peaks in the 1880s; in
the latter, the net proportion is higher in both the 1870s and 1890s than in the 1880s.
Comment Raymond W. Goldsmith
This is an important subject and an important, interesting, and well-
done paper. It could be discussed in at least four ways. One could,
first, discuss the reliability of and possible improvements in the nu-
merous series used in building up the estimates. Or one might mull
over some of the conceptual problems. Or one could indicate one's
agreement or disagreement with the interpretation of the estimates.
Finally, one could discuss the needs for and the possibility offurther
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work on estimates of capital formation in the nineteenth century or
even during the whole life ofthe Republic before World War I.
A detailed technical discussion ofGallman's estimates is well worth
doing, butit does not fit into the format ofthis meeting. Itwould require
a full session with not one but half-a-dozen discussants, including spe-
cialists on agriculture, housing, railroads, and inventories, at least, to
mention only the four sectors which account for about four-fifths of
the nineteenth-century capital stock in 1900. IfI had been so foolhardy
as to assay it by myselfit would have cost me several weeks hard work
(possible since Gallman was kind enough to provide me with a copy
of the detailed updated Gallman-Howle paper) without ensuring cor-
responding results. My appetite for discussion ofconcepts is limited,
and I feel they have for quite a while produced nothing that is new in
this field. I shall, therefore, make only a few remarks on techniques
ofestimation or concepts and shall limit myselfto a few aspects ofthe
interpretation of the figures given the numerous problems which the
paper discusses, and to some suggestion for further work in the field,
a subject which Gallman has omitted, undoubtedly reserving it for
another occasion.
I refrain from summarizing Gallman's paper. To do so would absorb
all the time allotted to me and would be oflittle help to those who have
not read the paper. Suffice it to say thatit is the most thorough treatment
of the subject; that it presents estimates for the capital stock of the
United States for seven decadal benchmark dates between 1840 and
1900 for a good dozen ofsectors in current and constant (1860) prices
separating land and reproducible tangible assets; that most of the es-
timates are of the census type but that perpetual-inventory-type esti-
mates are used for some components, rising from one-fifth to over one-
fourth ofthe total value; that the main innovation is the estimation of
the value ofagricultural land improvements (such as clearing, fencing,
and drainage) which are in effect shifted from land to reproducible
assets; and that otherwise it contains no surprises-thus the value of
the total capital stock for 1900 in current prices is $76 billion, which
does not include roads orconsumer durables, the latter ofwhich I very
roughly estimated 30 years ago to have risen from 8% to 11% ofother
reproducibles during the second half ofthe nineteenth century-com-
pared to $78 billion, in the estimate of Goldsmith et al. published 20
years ago.
In the broad field ofindividual estimates I shall limit myself to one
item: residential real estate, in part because it accounts for more than
one-fourth ofthe total capital stock-and one should always remember
the often forgotten advice given by Richard Stone over 30 years ago,
that researchefforts should be allocatedin proportionto the importance
of each item in the final result-and because I have difficulties in ac-208 Robert E. Gallman
cepting the use ofa land/structure ratio as high as 0.57 and in particular
its application to all benchmark dates. I also feel that it is advisable to
separate farm residences from other farm buildings.
The main innovation in the estimates is as just mentioned, the es-
timation of farmland improvements and their addition to the compo-
nents in previous estimates ofthe stock ofreproducible assets, an item
accounting for over one-half of farm reproducible assets though its
share in the national total declines from over one-third to one-eighth.
The effect of this innovation on what may be regarded as the single
most important ratio derivable from the new estimates, the rate of
growth of the real stock of reproducible capital, is striking. For the
period from 1840 to 1900 the rate of growth of that stock is 5.0%
compared with one of 5.4% in the old Gallman-Howle estimate and
5.2% in an antique like my estimate made over 30 years for 1850-1900
(Gallman, 5.3%). However, iffarmland improvements are included the
rate ofgrowth falls to 4.3o/o-virtually identical with Berry's estimate
of 1978-14% less than the new narrow series and 20% below the old
series. We are now in a different ballpark. So much for the national
aggregates. The effect of the innovation is, however, still more pro-
nounced on the per head rates of growth (per head of population of
labor force of per man-hour) which are more significant for many an-
alytical purposes, but which are not shown or discussed in the paper
except incidentally in table 4.6, a defect which I hope will be remedied
in the published version. Now, with an average annual rate ofgrowth
ofpopulation of2.5% oflaborforce of2.2%, and ofman-hours of1.8%,
the difference between the new and the old estimates becomes spec-
tacular. For capital stock per head of the population the average rate
of growth falls from 2.9% to 1.8%. That is a substantial difference
which sharply changes the comparison with earlier and later periods
in the United States and with othercountries during the same and other
periods. It also changes the movement of the ratio between 1840 and
1900. While the decadal growth rates formerly fell from 6.1% in the
1840s to 4.2% in the 1890s, or by one-third, the decline is now only
from 4.2% to 3.7% or by one-tenth. Per head of the population the
decline from 3.1 to 2.3 in the old series is changed to an increase from
1.1% to 1.8%, quite a different story.
The new series will also require a sharp revision of estimates of
saving and their interpretation. First, of course, the new estimates
increase total national net saving, and hence the saving ratio substan-
tially, for the period 1841-1900 by slightly more than one-tenth or by
nearly 1.5% ofnational product. (The change would be somewhatlower
if expenditures on land improvements were, as I would prefer, depre-
ciated rather than, as I understand their present treatment, carried at
the same value until retirement, Le., using a straight line, concave, or209 The United States Capital Stock in the Nineteenth Century
convex rather than a rectangular downward schedule.) As the new
estimates increase saving relatively more in the early than in the later
part ofthe eight decades, they also change the movements ofthe saving
rate over the period. Second, and more important, they greatly change
the distribution of total saving among sectors, sharply increasing the
share ofagriculture; among regions; among income and wealth groups,
increasing the share of the lower strata; and among forms of saving,
raising the share of direct saving where saving and capital formation
take place within the same economic unit and reducing that ofindirect
saving through financial instruments. Since no estimates ofsaving exist
before 1896 which break down national saving (except those that can
be derived from my 1952 estimate), the extent to which the inclusion
ofsaving in the form offarmland improvements will affect these break-
downs is uncertain, but it is very likely to be substantial, particularly
for the earlier part ofthe period.
Now for suggestions for further work. My main suggestion here,
influenced no doubtby my own work, is to develop perpetual inventory
estimatesfor additional components ofthe stockofreproducible capital
to bring up their share from the present level ofone-fifth to one-fourth
to as near 100% as possible. I am making this suggestion not to produce
annual estimates of the stock, but in order to ascertain the effects on
different estimates of capital formation, of different assumptions re-
garding length oflife, form ofdepreciation, retirement distribution and
scrap value, and ofdifferent deflators on the estimates. It is therefore
not essential to start from annual figures of capital expenditures, but
3-year oreven 5-year averages will do. The most important candidates
for this treatment are nonagricultural residential structures. I do not
have the time orthe knowledge ofthe sources to backup my conviction
that a perpetual inventory estimate ofthis component is possible, though
it may require that development ofnew sources, but shalljustmention
Gottlieb's annual series starting in 1840 ofnew units built. Two other
candidates are the railroads and, more doubtfully, agriculture. These
three components alone account for over 70% of the total stock in
current prices in 1900. A perpetual inventory estimate for total capital
formation is, ofcourse, within reach even back to the early nineteenth
century, using Berry's and Gallman's series for capital expenditures.
I would also suggest extending the estimates to include consumer
durables and possibly semidurables, roads, and standing timber, an
item whose treatment in the estimates is not clear to me, three items
(excluding roads) which I have estimated, again very roughly, in my
recent attemptto construct a national balance sheetofthe United States
to have amounted in 1900 to nearly one-fifth of the reproducible tan-
gibles included in Gallman's estimates. Except for semidurables I can
see no conceptual reason for exclusion. Even if perpetual inventory210 Robert E. Gallman
estimates cannot be made for the entire period, it would be worthwhile
to construct them for the period after the Civil War for which I feel
confident they are not beyond reach. In particular, use of the series
which the Bureau of Economic Analysis has developed as a basis for
its perpetual inventory ofthe reproducible capital stock from 1929 on
should be considered.
Finally, I would like Gallman to discuss, at least verbally, the prob-
able margins oferror in the main component series ifhe is not willing
to follow Simon Kuznets's bold example of half a century ago-as
always ahead of the crowd-of indicating quantitatively the range of
the margins.
There has not been a chance, unfortunately, to comment, among
other things, on Gallman's interesting interpretation ofmovements of
the capital formation and capital output ratios with which I generally
agree. All I can say is, go and read the entire paper carefully if you
have not already done so.
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